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I. JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996).
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the stipulation and property settlement agreement
entered into by the parties and incorporated in the decree of divorce is
an integrated unambiguous contract adopted by them as a final and
complete expression of their agreement.
Determination as to whether a contract is integrated is a factual determination and
requires a clearly erroneous standard of review. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945
P.2d 180, 190 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). ]
Whether contractual language is ambiguous is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness according no deference to the trial court. Hall v. Process Instruments and
Control Inc., 866 P.2d 604, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) affd, 890 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1995).
2. Whether the Trial Court properly granted Summary
Judgment on Elizabeth's petition to modify the alimony award by
finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
there was a substantial, material change in Elizabeth's health not
foreseeable at the time of divorce.
Whether a divorce decree should be modified because the parties have
experienced a substantial, material change of circumstances requires an abuse of

1

In his standards of review analysis, Appellee's counsel has relied on Judge Norman H.
Jackson's Utah Standards of Appellate Review, Utah Bar Journal, Vol 1, No. 8, October 1994
(Collectors issue) and his update or revision thereof, Utah Standards of Appellate Review,
Revised, Utah Bar Journal, Vol 12, No. 8, October 1999.
1

discretion standard of review. Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999);
Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
"Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, [appellate courts] give
the trial court's legal conclusions no particular deference," and reviews the issues under a
correctness standard. Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d, 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(citation omitted).
3. Whether the Trial Court properly dismissed Elizabeth's
fraud claim that Richard misrepresented the value of the assets listed
in the property settlement agreement, on the grounds that Elizabeth
acknowledged in the stipulation that there was a genuine dispute as to
the values of the real and personal property and agreed to resolve the
dispute as to the values by accepting the real and personal property as
allocated.
Whether the trial court properly dismissed Elizabeth's fraud claim under Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is reviewed for correctness according no deference to the trial court.
Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345, 500 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
If a motion to dismiss . . . is presented, the decision to consider matters
outside the pleadings initially lies in the discretion of the trial court. Strand
v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1977).
4. Whether Richard should be awarded reasonable attorney
fees for this appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 3.
A. Citations to Record showing issues preserved for appeal.
Issue 1 (AR 0616-0618)
Issue 2 (AR 1206-1209)
2

Issue 3 (AR 0614-0616)
III. STATUTES AND RULES DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (see Brief of Appellant P. 2-4).
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1996) (see Brief of Appellant, P. 4-7).
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (see Addendum for full text).
Utah R. App. P. 33 (see Addendum for full text).

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
The parties in this case were married on March 7, 1965. Elizabeth filed for divorce
on March 2, 1992.
After a thorough and exhaustive discovery process, the three-day trial of the case
began on May 31, 1994, before the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, resumed on June 6,
1994, and concluded on June 14,1994. Judge Bumingham took the case under advisement.
After the trial, and before Judge Burningham handed down a decision in the case, the
parties hammered out a settlement agreement which was signed on July 1, 1994.
The findings and fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce, in which the terms
of the stipulation and settlement agreement was incorporated, were signed by Judge
Burningham on July 5, 1994.

Elizabeth's attorney found certain errors in the property descriptions set forth in the
documents. The errors were corrected and amended findings of fact conclusions of law and
an amended decree of divorce were signed by Judge Burningham on September 8, 1994.
The parties engaged in several post-decree skirmishes over the terms and conditions
of the stipulation and property settlement agreement.
On July 1,1996, Elizabeth filed a motion for order to show cause, seeking $1,900 in
alimony, $750 for a security and cleaning deposit and for her costs in seeking this relief
On July 17,1996, Richard filed a motion to enter judgment against Elizabeth for rent
from the Birrell rental home he claimed he was entitled to under the decree of divorce.
On August 9, 1996, the court entered an order on the parties' motions, finding that
(1) Elizabeth is not entitled to recover alimony in the amount of $950 for the month of
January, because the Birrell rental home had not been sold; (2) that she is not entitled to
recover alimony in the amount of $950 for February of 1996 because it had been paid; (3)
that she is not entitled to recover $750 for the security and cleaning deposit because of the
mutual release contained in the stipulation and property settlement agreement; (4) the
language of the stipulation and property settlement agreement and decree of divorce entitles
Richard to collect $950 per month from the Birrell rental home from the date of the entry
of the decree of divorce until February 2, 1996, when the property was sold; (5) the court
4

reserved ruling on Richard's motion to enter judgment against Elizabeth, if Elizabeth files
a petition to modify the decree of divorce on or before August 5, 1996 and that if she
doesn't, the court would enter judgment on behalf of Richard against Elizabeth for the rent
from the Birrell home.
On August 5, 1996, Elizabeth filed a petition to modify and for clarification and a
reformation of decree in which she alleged, among other things, that (1) the terms of the
stipulation and property settlement agreement addressing alimony and the right to receive
rent from the Birrell property, are vague and ambiguous; (2) since the date of the decree
of divorce, Elizabeth has experienced a substantial change in the condition of her health that
justifies a modification of the alimony award; and (3) Richard fraudulently misrepresented
the values of the real and personal property listed in the stipulation and property settlement
agreement.
On October 2, 1996, Richard filed a motion to dismiss the petition to modify the
decree pursuant to UtahR. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
On January 29,1997, the trial court granted Richard's motion to dismiss Elizabeth's
claim that the stipulation and property settlement agreement and decree of divorce are
ambiguous and it granted the motion to dismiss the fraud claim as well.

5

With respect to Elizabeth's petition to modify the alimony provisions of the decree
based on a material change in the condition of her health, the court held that her petition to
modify may proceed as to the effect of her broken wrist, the steady decline in her health and
the deterioration of her bones but may not proceed on the basis of her back injury, the injury
to her knee, the problems with her feet and her underactive thyroid except as these
conditions may have worsened since the decree.
On February 6, 1997, the court, having ruled that the stipulation and property
settlement and decree of divorce are unambiguous as to Richard's entitlement to the rent
from the Birrell property, entered judgment against Elizabeth for $20,158.20.
On March 19, 1997, Elizabeth filed a motion for judgment against Richard for
mortgage payments she claimed were due under Paragraph 5 of the amended decree of
divorce.
Richard filed a motion to correct clerical mistake on April 21, 1997 in which he
alleged that the decree of divorce mistakenly stated the mortgage payments as a fixed rate
instead of a variable rate mortgage.
On August 5, 1997, the court denied Richard's motion to correct clerical error and
granted Elizabeth's motion to enter judgment against Richard in the amount of $10,694.74
plus interest. The court held that the plain language of the divorce decree mandated that
6

Richard was obligated to make the mortgage payments as recited in that document.
On August 15, 1997, Richard filed a motion for summary judgment in his favor and
against Elizabeth, for the relief sought in the petition to modify the alimony provisions of
the decree of divorce on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether there was a substantial, material change in Elizabeth's health nol foreseeable at the
time of divorce.
The court granted Richard's motion for summary judgment on January 16, 1998.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Facts relevant to the issue of whether the stipulation and property
settlement agreement entered into by the parties and incorporated
in the decree of divorce is an integrated unambiguous contract

a. The parties engaged in thorough pre-trial discovery (AR 0073).
b. After the trial of their case and before the court ruled, the parties and their counsel
signed a stipulation and property settlement agreement with the understanding that it was
intended to settle the rights and obligations of the parties in all respects. (AR 0170-0187).
c. The parties certified that each of them has entered into the settlement agreement
upon mature consideration; that consent to the execution of the settlement agreement has not
been obtained by duress or undue influence of any person, and that based thereon, the

7

settlement agreement is fair and reasonable. (AR 0185).
d. The parties expressed their intent, and stated that it was the purpose of the
agreement, to make a complete and final settlement of all claims that Elizabeth may have
against Richard for alimony and to finalize their agreements as to the division of property,
both real and personal owned by them or either of them. (AR 0186).
e. Except as specified in the agreement, each party was released and absolved from
the deeds of the other, and each released the other from any and all liabilities, debts, or
obligations of any kind or character incurred by the other, and from any and all claims and
demands except as stated in the agreement. (AR 0186)
f. Except as expressly provided in the settlement agreement, each party was fully
released by the other from any obligation for alimony, support, maintenance, attorney's fees
or court costs, and each party accepted the provisions of the agreement in full satisfaction
of all property rights and all obligations for support, or otherwise, arising out of the marital
relationship of the parties. The parties, except with respect to payments accruing under the
settlement agreement, released the other party from any claim of any kind, and specifically
relinquished any right, title or interest in or to any earnings, accumulations, future
investments, money or property of the other party. (AR 0184, 0185).

8

g. The court reviewed the stipulation and property settlement agreement, found that
it is fair and reasonable and that it was entered into voluntarily by the parties and their
counsel (AR 0278, 0279)
h. The parties and their counsel agreed that the stipulation and property settlement
agreement would be used as a basis for the final decree in the case, subject to and upon
approval of the court. (AR 0187)
i. Section VI of the stipulation and property settlement agreement addressing the
issue of alimony and designating the party entitled to receive the rent from the Birrell rental
home provides:
SECTION VI
Alimony
The parties hereby stipulate that the defendant shall
pay alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $1,000 per
month.
Defendant shall receive $950 per month from the B irrell
rental home until it is sold. When the Birrell rental home has
been sold, defendant shall pay an additional $950 per month to
plaintiff for alimony.
Plaintiffs alimony obligation to defendant shall cease on
July 1, 1996 and plaintiff hereby waives alimony after July 1,
1996 and forever. (AR 0171, 0172)

9

j . Section VI of the stipulation and property settlement agreement is incorporated in
paragraph 6 of the amended decree of divorce (AR 0280).
k. The divorce decree and the stipulation and property settlement agreement upon
which it is based constitute an integrated agreement. (AR 065).
2.

a.

Facts relevant to the issue as to whether there has been a
substantial, material change in Elizabeth's health not foreseeable
at the time of divorce.
Paragraph 6 of Elizabeth's petition to modify and for clarification and/or

reformation of decree provides:
5. There has been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry
of the decree of divorce relating to the contemplated health of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff has experienced continued need for medical treatment. Her
medical condition that existed at the time of the decree, and which was
contemplated to improve, has continued and/or worsened, requiring the
plaintiff to have frequent medical treatment, and preventing her from doing
many of the little things around the property and/or even attempting to
become employed part-time, in any manner to assist in her income. Among
other things,
(a) The plaintiff is currently in a cast and has continued difficulty with
her knee and feet.
(b) The plaintiff has been diagnosed as having a broken wrist which
needs to be operated on, and which likely will result in not being able to use
half of her left hand in the future.
(c) As a consequence of these conditions, the plaintiff has incurred
medical expenses beyond those contemplated, and will continue to experience
10

medical expenses in the future, not reasonably foreseen or contemplated at the
time of the decree of divorce.
b. Elizabeth testified at the trial about problems with her back, feet, right knee, leg,
and the medications she was taking.
Q.

Mrs. Lether, could you describe to the court what physical problems
that you have?

1.

I have sustained a back injury for about 11 years. I have problems with my
feet. They have bunions. One foot has already been taken care of. And years
ago I sustained an injury, skiing, to my right knee.

Q.

What is the present condition of your right knee?

A.

I have been told by my doctor that it is worn out. I do everything to keep it —

Q.

And what I want you to do is describe what physical symptoms you have as
a result of your bad right knee.

A.

My leg is becoming very crooked. My foot doctor says that some of the
problems I developed with my right foot was because I couldn't walk with a
straight leg. And because of this on times, numerous times, I do have
problems with my back. I cannot stand for any period of time.

Q.

Has your right knee been operated on?

A.

Twice.

Q.

When was the last operation?

A.

I would say probably 1986.

Q.

And what did they do for you?
11

A.

Is it arthroscope - -1 don't know how to say it - - where they go in with a
scope and clean out any of the calcium deposits that build up because of
injury?

Q.

Are you experiencing any pain from that right knee at this point?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And how frequent is the pain?

A.

It's almost continual.

Q.

Does it in any way impair your walking ability?

A.

It has slowed it down, but I still walk.

Q.

Are you taking medication for that?

A.

Yes, it's an anti-inflammatory called Daypro.

Q.

And what kind of costs are the medication?

A.

Daypro is pretty expensive. It usually runs me about possibly - -1 can't tell
you for sure. Daypro alone runs about maybe 70 or $80 every two to three
weeks depending upon how much I have to take.

Q.

And how often do you take it?

A.

I'm supposed to take it twice a day.

Q.

And do you take it twice a day?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, you mentioned an injury to your back. Have you ever been operated on
12

for that?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That was back in 1983?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And one disc was removed?

A.

They took it off the sciatic nerve. It had been blown through my spine. (AR
1311, Trial Transcript, p. 54-57).

c. Elizabeth's trial testimony revealed she had degenerative arthritis in her back and
knee at the time of divorce. Dr. Johnson testified at trial:
Q.

Did you take any complaints about her back?

A.

Without reviewing those records, she had several backgrounds, had surgery
on her back and some degenerative arthritis in her back and knee and some
trouble with her foot.

Without going back and reading my records

specifically. I can't remember where they all sort out.
(AR 1311, Trial Transcript, p 153)
Q.

Are you aware of any type of surgery she's had during the time you treated
her?

A.

I believe during the time she was a patient of mine, I think she did have

13

surgery on her back during that period of time, and also on her foot at least,
and I believe on her knee as well.
Q.

And on her foot, that was more recent surgery?

A.

Yes.
(AR 1311, Trial Transcript, p. 154-155)

d. Elizabeth testified at trial about her post-decree employment prospects.
Q.

With respect to your future plans after you got divorced - -1 assume it
will happen on the 6th - - what are your desires with respect to
becoming employed?

A.

I cannot hold a job because of my health, because of the condition of my
body. And I have no skills.

Q.

Do you desire to be employed?

A.

I don't know. I don't know if I could handle a job at this time. I'm 59 years
old, and I'm pretty worn out and I'm pretty beat.

Q.

So you do not desire to work?

1.

If there's a way that I could, I might. I just haven't thought that far ahead. I
don't think that I could. I had too much trouble, the few times I did, with my
back problem. And now with my legs and my feet, I don't' think that I could.
(AR 1311, Trial Transcript p. 127-128)

Q.

Do you have any skills, clerical skills?

A.

I know how to type, and I'm learning how to run computers.

14

Q.

How many words a minute can you type?

A.

I haven't clocked it for years, but I was doing 100 words a minute. I took
speed typing.

Q.

How many years ago was that?

A.

I was 18. That was 41 years ago.

Q.

I'm concerned about your present ability. Do you have any marketable typing
skills?

A.

They would be marketable, except that I cannot sit. I can't sit at a computer,
and I cannot sit at the typewriter.

Q.

When you say they're marketable, when is the last time you took a typing test?

A.

41 years ago.

Q.

So do you know how many words a minute you can type?

A.

Not now.

Q.

Do you know what it would take to get even an entry level job as far as typing
skills?

A.

I'm not familiar with it. (AR 1311, Trial Transcript, p. 81-82)

Elizabeth was also questioned about her attempts to find employment with her
computer and typing background:
Q.

Have you attempted to find any employment with your computer background?

A.

No.
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Q.

Have you attempted to find any employment with your typing background?

A. No, I've looked in the papers, but they want more than that. They want office
machines, which I do not know how to run. There's other skills that they're
asking for. I could file possibly if I could bend. I don't know what they
consist
of, but I know I have called even on reception jobs and I'm underqualified.
Q.

Vm sorry?

A.

I'm underqualified even for reception jobs.

Q.

What would a reception job entail?

A.

I would have to know how to use the office machines as well. And it would
entail long periods of sitting, according to how long they wanted me there. 1
don't think I could ever do much sitting beyond two to three hours. I would
have to get up.

Q.

Essentially during the last 29 years of marriage have you had an opportunity
to develop any of your business skills or office skills?

A.

No.

(AR 1311, Trial Transcript, p. 83-84)
e. Elizabeth has been unemployed from 1968 to the present date, except for one
afternoon a week for twelve weeks in 1982 and 1983. (AR 0860)
f. Elizabeth's affidavit in opposition to Richard's motion for summary judgment
alleges the following post-decree health problems:
1. A deterioration of her health
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2. A deterioration of the bones in some of her joints.
3. Surgery on her left wrist
4. Removal of a cataract from her left eye
5. Surgery for corrective treatment of her feet
6. Deterioration of her knee joints.
7. Total right knee replacement
8. Rehabilitative physical therapy
9. Problems with her right wrist
10. Trouble with her feet
11. Increased medical expenses.
(AR 0890-0893).
g. The clinical notes of Dr. Michael E. Callahan, M.D., reveal the following:
1. Elizabeth had a total right knee replacement in 1995 and x-rays of the left
knee show severe progressive degenerative arthritis in her left Iknee which
may require total knee replacement (0883)
2. Elizabeth has a significant deformity of her left foot (0883).
3. Elizabeth was doing well after her right knee replacement (0882)
4. Elizabeth had problems with her right ankle, her right knee and her left
wrist. The pain in her wrist resulted from a fall in 1995. X-rays showed that
appeared to be an old scaphoid fracture with a very large cyst within the
scaphoid bone itself.
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The x-rays of the right ankle showed an extra ossicle at the tip of the
lateral malleolus and some mild degenerative change along the medial side
but the matter appears to be intact and the tibial talar joint appears to be
essentially normal.
Elizabeth has had some degenerative changes in the knee in the past
and these were still present on examination.
(AR 0882)
5. On August 24, 1994, the doctor noted that Elizabeth has had a long
history of degenerative arthritis in the right knee and has known of this
problem for quite a long time. X-rays were taken of both knees. The right
knee also showed severe degeneration. The left knee also showed moderate
changes with narrowing of both the medial and lateral joint clear spaces and
marginal osteophte formation. The doctor noted that Elizabeth would
undoubtedly require a total knee replacement on the right side and considered
the left knee for an arthroscopic clean out as a temporary measure. (AR 0880)
h. Dr. Thomas G. Rogers performed corrective surgery on Elizabeth's right foot in
1992. The foot improved for a couple of years and it appeared that it would not give her
trouble other than for normal aging. He noted that it has deteriorated considerably in the last
two years and her left foot is developing similar problems.
Dr. Rogers was of the opinion that Elizabeth will need corrective surgery on her left
foot as well or additional corrective surgery on her right foot. He noted that Elizabeth could
not hold down a job that requires her to be on her feet or any use of her feet.
(AR0860)

18

i. On January 6, 1998. the court made the following findings of fact when it granted
Richard's motion for summary judgment:
1. There is no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether it was
foreseeable that Elizabeth may be unemployed after the divorce.
2. Elizabeth described her health problems at trial and admitted that
she had no marketable job skills.
3. Elizabeth's own testimony demonstrates that she anticipated that she
would not be able to work.
4. Other than a brief time in 1982, Elizabeth never worked outside the
home during the entire marriage of the parties, nor has she worked outside of
the home since.
5. There is no real issue as to Elizabeth's circumstances at the time of
trial.
6. Elizabeth's circumstances may have worsened, but she was not
employable at anything but minimum wage at the time of trial, and clearly it
was foreseeable then that she may not be employable even at minimum wage.
7. Elizabeth's health difficulties which she now suffers largely result
from the exacerbation of her then existing health circumstances.
8. These exacerbations also were foreseeable.
9. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to the foreseeability of
her present circumstances.
10. Where it is so obvious that the driving force in this case is
Elizabeth's belief that the property settlement was unfair, the court declines
to reenter the property settlement of the parties.
(AR 1270, 1271)
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3.

Facts relevant to the issue as to whether the trial court properly dismissed
Elizabeth's fraud claim that Richard misrepresented the value of the
assets listed in the property settlement agreement.

a. Elizabeth was present each day of the three-day trial of this case
during which witnesses for the parties gave conflicting testimony as to the
values of the real and personal property in the marital estate.
(AR 0301, Trial Transcript, p. 31-169)
(AR 0131, Trial Transcript, p. 163-196)
b. Elizabeth signed a stipulation and property settlement in which she
acknowledged a genuine dispute as to the values of the property and agreed
to resolve the dispute by accepting the property as allocated. (AR 0184)
c. Elizabeth was awarded property in the amount of $ 1,098,768.00 and
assumed debt in the amount of $257,569.63. Richard was awarded property
in the amount of $645,174.00 and assumed debt in the amount of
$593,180.00. (AR 0780-0295)
4.

Facts relevant to the issue as to whether Richard should be
awarded reasonable attorney fees for this appeal pursuant to Utah
R. App. P. 33(a).
a. The driving force in this case is Elizabeth's belief that the property

settlement is unfair. (AR 1171).
b. Elizabeth's fraud claim "flies right into the face of her own
voluntary representation" that there was a dispute as to the values of the
property in the marital estate and that she agreed to resolve the dispute by
accepting the real and personal property as allocated. (AR 0614-0615).
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c. Elizabeth challenged the trial court's findings of fact, but merely
selected excerpts of trial testimony in support of her own position, omitted
negative facts and reargued the same case made before the trial court. (Brief
of Appellant, p. 11-20, 30-40).
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

THE STIPULATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES AND
INCORPORATED IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IS
AN INTEGRATED, UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACT
ADOPTED BY THEM AS A FINAL AND COMPLETE
EXPRESSION OF THEIR AGREEMENT.

After extensive pre-trial discovery and a three-day trial, the parties took advantage
of a narrow window of opportunity before the trial judge ruled on the case, to take their fate
into their own hands and fashion a settlement to their liking. They hammered out a
settlement which is reflected in a stipulation and property settlement agreement signed by
the parties and their counsel on July 1, 1994. The terms of the agreement are incorporated
in the decree of divorce. The court signed the decree on July 6, 1994.
Subsequently, Elizabeth found certain errors in the legal description. The parties
corrected them and the court signed an amended decree on September 8, 1994.
Elizabeth filed a petition to modify the decree in which she asserted that the alimony
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provision of the decree are ambiguous. She further asserted that the decree should be
interpreted to mean that she was entitled to receive the rent from the Birrell property.
The court made a factual determination that the decree and the settlement stipulation
upon which it is based constitute an integrated agreement adopted by the parties as a final
and complete expression of their agreement.
The trial court's findings of fact that the settlement stipulation is an integrated
agreement is not clearly erroneous and should be affirmed.
Elizabeth has failed to show the finding is clearly erroneous by marshaling all
evidence supporting the findings and then demonstrating that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the findings when viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court
findings.
The court also found as a matter of law that the stipulation and property settlement
agreement and the amended decree are not ambiguous.
The trial court's ruling on this issue should be affirmed. The trial court correctly
selected, interpreted and applied the law relating to the alleged ambiguity of the language
of the settlement agreement of the parties.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ELIZABETH'S PETITION TO MODIFY THE
ALIMONY AWARD BY FINDING THAT THERE IS NO GENUINE
22

ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER THERE WAS A
SUBSTANTIAL, MATERIAL CHANGE IN ELIZABETH'S HEALTH NOT
FORESEEABLE AT THE TIME OF DIVORCE.
Elizabeth bargained away a long-term alimony award in exchange for a larger share
of the real and personal property acquired by the parties during the marriage. Two years
later she inexplicably decided she not only wanted a long-term alimony award but she also
wanted an even larger share of the real and personal property.
The trial court, after having considered many post-decree requests for relief from
Elizabeth, concluded that it was obvious that the driving force in the case was Elizabeth's
belief that the settlement agreement was unfair. The court elected to strictly enforce the
agreement as to both parties.
Acting on her belief that the settlement agreement was unfair., Elizabeth filed a
petition to modify the decree of divorce in which she asserted that she had experienced a
substantial, material change in the condition of her health since the date of the decree which
would justify a revision of the alimony award.
Elizabeth's health problems which existed at the time of the divorce were well
documented during the trial proceedings.
The court, citing Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(g)(i)(ii) (1996), as statutory guidance
for this case held that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a
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substantial, material change in Elizabeth's health not foreseeable at the time of divorce.
The determination of the trial court that there has not been a substantial change of
circumstances is presumed valid and should be reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Elizabeth has failed to show that the trial court had no reasonable basis for the
decision or that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
ELIZABETH'S FRAUD CLAIM THAT RICHARD
MISREPRESENTED THE VALUE OF THE ASSETS
LISTED IN THE STIPULATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

The disposition of a motion to dismiss is reviewed for correctness according no
deference to the trial court.
The parties were well aware, after extensive pre-trial discovery and a three-day trial
of this case, that they had a genuine disagreement as to the value of the real and personal
property in the marital estate. The witnesses called to testify at trial gave conflicting
testimony as to values. The parties had a genuine dispute on this issue.
Elizabeth asserted in her petition to modify that during the negotiations which led to
the settlement agreement, Richard purposefully misrepresented the values of the marital
assets.
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The stipulation and property settlement contains a provision that "[t]he parties hereby
agree that there is a genuine dispute as to the value of the real and personal property
hereafter set forth. The parties have agreed to resolve the dispute as to the values by
accepting the real and personal property as allocated."
The court correctly ruled that Elizabeth's "new claim flies right into the face of her
own voluntary representation that there was a dispute as to the values and each was
accepting the allocation of real and personal property. Simply put, Elizabeth has come to
regret her bargain. But a bargain it was, and she cannot attack it because of the claimed
fraud when the record is unequivocal that the parties each made concessions and each
acknowledged a dispute as to property values."
The court's ruling in that regard should be affirmed.
D.

RICHARD SHOULD BE AWARDED REASONABLE
ATTORNEY FEES FOR THIS APPEAL PURSUANT TO
UTAHR. APP. P. 33(a).

Utah R. App. P. 33 authorizes recovery of damages and reasonable attorney fees if
the court determines that an appeal is frivolous. A frivolous appeal is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good-faith argument to
modify or reverse existing law.
The most egregious example of Elizabeth's culpability under this rule is her
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unfounded allegation of fraud against Richard that he purposely misrepresented the values
of the real and personal property during their settlement negotiations.
As the trial court pointed out, Elizabeth's fraud claim "flies right into the face of her
own voluntary representation that there was a dispute as to the values and each was
accepting the allocation of the real and personal property."
The trial court determined early on in Elizabeth's post-decree efforts to undo what
the parties had painstakingly accomplished, that it was "obvious that the driving force in this
case is Elizabeth's belief that the property settlement was unfair."
Elizabeth's appeal is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, and not
based on a good-faith argument to modify the divorce decree. This court should award
Richard reasonable attorney fees incurred for this appeal.
VI. ARGUMENT
A.

THE STIPULATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES AND
INCORPORATED IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IS AN
INTEGRATED, UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACT ADOPTED
BY THEM AS A FINAL AND COMPLETE EXPRESSION OF
THEIR AGREEMENT.

Determination as to whether a contract is integrated is a factual determination which
requires a clearly erroneous standard of review. Findings of fact will not be set aside on
appeal unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence and clearly erroneous, with
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due consideration given to the trial court to judge credibility of witnesses.
To overturn the trial court's findings of fact, appellant must first marshal all of the
evidence supporting the findings and then demonstrate that, even if viewed in a light most
favorable to the trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings. BailyAllen Co. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180, 190 {Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Whether contractual language is ambiguous is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness, according no deference to the trial court. Id. at 190.
The trial court's factual finding that the settlement agreement of the parties is an
integrated agreement, and the court's legal conclusion that the agreement is unambiguous
should be affirmed.
Elizabeth's failure to marshal the evidence permits the appellate court to assume that
the record supports the factual finding by the trial court that the agreement of the parties is
an integrated agreement and to proceed to a review of the accuracy of the trial court's
conclusions of law that the agreement is unambiguous.
Elizabeth claims that the following section of the stipulation and property settlement
is ambiguous:
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Section VI
Alimony.
The parties hereby stipulate and agree that the Defendant shall pay
alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $1,000.00 per month payable by the
10th of each month.
Defendant shall receive $950 per month from the Birrell rental home
until it is sold. When the Birrell rental home has been sold, Defendant shall
pay an additional $950.00 per month to plaintiff for alimony.
Plaintiffs alimony obligation to defendant shall cease on July 1, 1996
and plaintiff hereby waives alimony after July 1, 1996 and forever.
This section is repeated verbatim in the divorce decree.
On examination of the last paragraph of section VI it is clear that it should read
"Defendant's alimony obligation to plaintiff instead of "Plaintiff s alimony obligation to
defendant/'
Elizabeth argues that because the words plaintiff and defendant were incorrectly
stated in the last paragraph of section VI, it is logical to assume that they were also
incorrectly stated in the previous paragraph. She sought to persuade the court that the
previous paragraph should read "plaintiff shall receive $950.00 per month from the Birrell
rental home until it is sold."
Elizabeth argues further that when the Birrell rental home is sold, Richard would
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have to pay Elizabeth an additional $950.00 per month and Elizabeth's alimony would be
suddenly increased for apparently no good reason.
The section of the settlement agreement addressing payment of debts and obligations
provides:
SECTION VI
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS
. . . The defendant shall pay the following debts and obligations
incurred by the parties during the marriage:
The Defendant shall pay the monthly mortgage payment on the Birrell
property in the amount of $1,630.00 and the monthly payment on the farm
property in the amount of $1,600.00 until such debts have been paid from the
proceeds of the sale of the properties by plaintiff or until July 1, 1996,
whichever event occurs first and thereafter the plaintiff shall assume and pay
the obligations on the Birrell and farm property and hold the Defendant
harmless therefrom. (AR 0173, 01774).
Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, Richard paid $ 1,000.00 per month alimony
and monthly mortgage payments of $3,320.00 for Elizabeth's benefit. The quidpro quo for
that arrangement was that Richard would receive the $950.00 payment from the Birrell
rental property.
The parties agreed that when the Birrell rental property was sold and Richard would
no longer have to pay the monthly mortgage payments, he would pay Elizabeth an
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additional $950.00 per month alimony.
Elizabeth and her attorney proffered extrinsic evidence in an attempt to bolster their
interpretation of the alimony provision of the decree.
The court ruled that it would be inappropriate to refer to parole evidence if the
agreement is an unambiguous integrated agreement. (AR 0617).
Elizabeth and her attorney proffered that the parties intended that she should receive
$2,000.00 per month alimony for two years. (AR 0423, 0564-0565, Appellant's Brief, p.
29)

The proffered extrinsic evidence shows that Elizabeth received more in the settlement

agreement than she expected to receive at the time of the negotiations.
Although only $ 1,000 of the $4,230.00 monthly payments being made on her behalf
by Richard was characterized as alimony, she was indeed receiving more than she claimed
she expected during the settlement talks. The rental from the Birrell property would have
increased that amount to $5,180.00 per month.
If the court erred in not considering the extrinsic evidence offered by Elizabeth and
her trial counsel, it was harmless error.
"Error" that does not affect substantial rights of the parties is not reversible error, but
harmless error. Utah R, Civ. P. 61; Accord State v. Perez, 924 P2d 1, 3 {Utah Ct. App.
1996).
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Elizabeth has the burden of showing not only that an error occurred, but that it was
substantial and prejudicial. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987).
To demonstrate prejudice, Elizabeth must show reasonable likelihood that without
the error, there would have been a different result. Tingey v. Christensen, 373 Utah Adv.
Rep, 10, 2 (Utah 1999). This likelihood must be high enough to undermine confidence in
the outcome. State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 902 (Utah Ct. App, 1996).,
Elizabeth has failed to meet her burden of proof in this regard.
The trial court interpreted the stipulation and property settlement agreement
according to the standards set out in Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 866 P.2d
604, 606 (Utah Ct. App, 1993), affd, 890 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1995).
The Court held:
Once a court determines that an agreement is integrated, parol
evidence, although not admissible to vary or contradict the clear and
unambiguous terms of the contract, is admissible to clarify ambiguous terms.
Colonial Leasing Co. v.LarsenBros. Constr.,731 P.2d 483,487 (Utah 1986).
The application of the parol evidence rule therefore involves two steps. First,
the court must determine whether the agreement is integrated. If the court
finds the agreement is integrated, then parol evidence may be admitted only
if the court makes a subsequent determination that the language of the
agreement is ambiguous.
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Also noted in Hall,
[a]n integrated agreement is defined as a "writing or writings
constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement." . . .
This court has held that . . . the court must determine whether the parties
adopted a particular writing or writings "as the final and complete expression
of their bargain."
Hall, supra, at

, citations omitted.

Applying these principles to this case, there can be no question that the
parties intended the settlement stipulation to be a final and complete
expression of their bargain and they thereafter incorporated that bargain into
the amended decree. The decree and the settlement stipulation upon which it
is based thus constitute an integrated agreement.
Further, on its face the amended decree is not ambiguous. It only
appears ambiguous if reference is made to sources outside the document, such
as the notes of Mr. Mitsunaga. Because it is unambiguous on its face, it is
inappropriate for this court to refer to parol evidence, such as Mr. Mitsunaga's
affidavit or notes.
While Elizabeth will think this result is harsh, she had ample
opportunity to remedy the problem early on as shortly after the original decree
was entered the parties recognized that it contained some errors and they
caused it to be amended. Certainly Elizabeth could have corrected then the
provision she now claims is in error. To assert, some two years later, that
additional errors exist in the decree is disingenuous. I grant the motion to
dismiss the claim that the amended decree is ambiguous."
As Elizabeth has pointed out, "when determining whether a contract is ambiguous,
any relevant evidence must be considered." Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923,928 {Utah Ct.
App. 1998), (Quoting Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assfn, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah
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1995). The court must also "consider the writing in light of the surrounding circumstances."
Id. (quoting Ward, 902 P.2d at 268). "Language in a written document is ambiguous if the
words may be understood to support two or more plausible meanings." Id, at 269 (citations
omitted).
In Ward, the court said "excluding such evidence would by no means gut the purpose
of the parole evidence rule, which is "to limit the ability of the finder of fact (the jury) to
believe testimony contradicting integrated writings." Corbin, §572 (Suppl.19).
This is not a case where the extrinsic evidence if believed by the fact finder, would
contradict the parties' written agreement." Id., at 269.
As Chief Justice Zimmerman pointed out in his dissent in Ward, the "holding that a
court may consider extrinsic evidence in determining whether a contract is ambiguous
unjustifiably departs from established Utah precedent." Id., at 27.
Richard has pointed out that if the trial court erred by not considering extrinsic
evidence in determining whether the alimony provisions of the agreement are ambiguous,
it was harmless error. The trial judge did not commit reversible error and his ruling should
be affirmed.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ELIZABETH'S
PETITION TO MODIFY THE ALIMONY AWARD
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BY FINDING THAT THERE IS NO GENUINE
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER
THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL
CHANGE IN ELIZABETH'S HEALTH NOT
FORESEEABLE AT THE TIME OF DIVORCE.
Whether a divorce decree should be modified because the parties have experienced
a substantial material change of circumstances requires an abuse of discretion standard of
review. Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Ut Ct App. 1992). Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d
438, 443 (Ut CtApp. 1998).
Summary judgment is granted as a matter of law and the Appellate Court gives the
trial court's legal conclusions, no particular deference and reviews the issues under a
correctness standard. Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law which the appellate court reviews
for correctness. Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 929 (Utah Ct App. 1998).
After a 27-year marriage, Elizabeth filed for divorce on March 2, 1992.
This bitterly contested divorce proceeded through exhaustive pre-trial discovery and
culminated in a three-day trial. Before the trial judge ruled, the parties and their counsel
spent many hours negotiating a resolution of the disputes between them.
Elizabeth and Richard finally reached an agreement which was intended to settle their
respective rights and obligations in all respects. Their agreement is reflected in a stipulation
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and property settlement agreement signed by the parties and their counsel on July 1, 1994.
Elizabeth was awarded real and personal property in the amount of $1,098,768.00
and assumed $257,569.63 in debt. Richard was awarded real and personal property in the
amount of $645,174.00 and assumed $593,180.00 in debt.
Elizabeth bargained away a long-term alimony award in exchange for a
disproportionate share of their real and personal property.
Richard agreed to pay $1,000.00 per month for 2 years as alimony to Elizabeth. In
addition, he agreed to pay the mortgages on the Birrell and farm property in the amount of
$3,320.00 per month for a total monthly payment of $4,230.00.
The alimony was scheduled to terminate as of July 1,1996. The mortgage payments
were to continue until July 1,1996, or until the property was sold, whichever occurred first.
The Birrell property was sold on February 6, 1996.
The parties agreed that Richard would receive the $950.00 monthly rental from the
Birrell property until it was sold and that he would increase his alimony payment to
Elizabeth by that amount after the sale of the Birrell property.
On August 5,1996, Elizabeth filed a petition to modify the alimony provisions of the
decree of divorce in which she asserted that she had experienced a substantial, material
change in the condition of her health which would entitle her to alimony for a longer period
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of time than agreed in the stipulation of the parties and provided in the amended decree.
Elizabeth must show that the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that there
has not been a substantial change of circumstances in Elizabeth's health not foreseeable at
the time of divorce.
"The determination of the trial court that there [has or has not] been a substantial
change of circumstances . . . is presumed valid" and we review the ruling under an abuse of
discretion standard. Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 {Utah Ct App. 1999), Wilde v.
Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Ut Ct App. 1998), Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1048 (Ut Ct
App. 1994).
A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no reasonable basis for the decision."
Crookston v. Fere Ins. Exck, 860 P.2d 937,938 (Utah 1993). A trial judge's determination
will be reversed if the ruling ... "is so unreasonable that it can be classified as arbitrary and
capricious or a clear abuse of discretion. Kunzler v. O 'Nell., 855 P.2d 270,275 (Ut Ct App.
1993).
To ensure the court acted within its broad discretion, the facts and reasons for the
court's decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions." Barnes v.
Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 {Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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The trial judge in this case made meticulous findings of fact.

Elizabeth has

challenged them but failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings and
then to show that the findings are unsupported by the evidence.
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate.
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal
flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this plan must be sufficient to convince
the appellate court that the court's finding resting on the evidence is clearly
erroneous. Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) quoting
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 801 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
Marshaling the evidence first entails marshaling, or listing, all the evidence
supporting the finding that is challenged. Tingey v. Christensen, 373 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,11
(Utah 1999).
Once the evidence is listed or marshaled with appropriate citation to the record, the
appellant must then show that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the
findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the decision.
Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433-34 (Utah 1998).
Elizabeth has merely presented selected facts in support of her own position, omitted
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negative facts, marshaled facts to try to improve her position, and reargued the same case
made before the trial court. (Brief of Appellant, p. 16-19, 33-40)
If an appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, appellate courts must assume
the findings are correct. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998).
Because Elizabeth has failed to marshal the evidence and then show that the findings
are unsupported, the trial court's ruling that there was no substantial material change in
Elizabeth's health not foreseeable at the time of divorce should be affirmed.
Elizabeth argues that the court should not have granted Richard's motion for
summary judgment on Elizabeth's petition to modify the alimony provisions of the divorce
decree because "genuine issues as to material facts exist regarding Mrs. Lether's claim for
alimony." (Brief of Appellant, p. 33).
In Wardv. Intermountain Farmers Ass 'n, 907 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1995), the court
stated the applicable standard of review for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of
material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d at 235
(Utah 1993); Ferre v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). "We determine
only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether
the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material
fact." Ferre, 784 P.2d at 151 (citing Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672
P.2d 746, 749 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah
1982).
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Because Elizabeth failed to properly marshal the facts, this court must assume the
trial court's findings are correct.
Elizabeth has not argued that the trial court erred in applying the governing law
relating to her petition to modify the alimony provision of the divorce decree.
In its ruling on Richard's motion for summary judgment the court stated
Utah Code. Ann. § 30-3-5-7(g) contains statutory guidance for this case. It provides:
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material
change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the
decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that
justify that action.
The trial court correctly ruled that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether there was a substantial, material change in Elizabeth's health not foreseeable at the
time of divorce.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED ELIZABETH'S
FRAUD CLAIM THAT RICHARD MISREPRESENTED THE
VALUE OF THE ASSETS LISTED IN THE STIPULATION
AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

Whether a trial court properly dismissed a claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is
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reviewed for correctness. Larsen v. Park CityMun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1998).
In so reviewing, the appellate court "takefs] as true all well-pled allegations of fact
in the complaint and all reasonable inferences from those facts." Richardson v. Matador
Steak House, Inc., 948 P.2d 347, 348 (Utah 1997).
"If a motion to dismiss . . . is presented, the decision to consider matters outside the
pleadings initially lies in the discretion of the trial court." Strand v. Associated Students of
the Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977).
Paragraph 12 of the stipulation and property settlement agreement provides:
The parties agree that there is a genuine dispute as to the value of the
real and personal property hereafter set forth. The parties have agreed to
resolve the dispute as to values by accepting the real and personal property as
allocated. (AR0184).
Elizabeth's fraud claim against Richard is groundless. She claims that during the
negotiations which produced the settlement agreement Richard purposefully misrepresented
the values of the marital assets.
The court correctly ruled that Elizabeth's "new claim flies right in the face of her own
voluntary representation that there was a dispute as to the values and each was accepting the
allocation of real and personal property. Simply put, Elizabeth has come to regret her
bargain. But a bargain it was and she cannot attack it because of the claimed fraud when the
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record is unequivocal that the parties each made concessions and each acknowledged a
dispute as to property values." (AR 0614, 0615)
The court, during oral argument on Richard's motion to dismiss the fraud claim,
addressed this issue.
THE COURT: Let me ask this question at the outset. At what point is
there going to be finality of this case?
MR. FINDLAY: I hope it will be soon Judge.
THE COURT: It strikes me that if you had a three-day trial and then
you say to the Judge, "Don't issue any findings. We're going to try to solve
this." And then you spend considerable effort over several days negotiating
to arrive at a settlement, I'm struggling to understand why I should even give
any credence at all to your position in this matter." (AR 1308, p. 8)
The trial judge held that the law on this subject is well settled.
When a decree is based upon a property settlement agreement, forged
by the parties and sanctioned by the court, equity must take such agreement
into consideration. Equity is not available to reinstate rights and privileges
voluntarily contracted away simply because one has come to regret the
bargain made. Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 1114 (UtahApp. Ct. 1989), quoting
Landv. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980).
The trial court correctly granted Richard's motion to dismiss Elizabeth's fraud claim
and this court should affirm the ruling.
D.

RICHARD SHOULD BE AWARDED REASONABLE
ATTORNEY FEES FOR THIS APPEAL PURSUANT TO UTAH
R. APP. P. 33(a)
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's
fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted
by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief or other paper.
In Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 931 Utah App. Ct. (1998), the court said:
. . . although this court is authorized under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure to award attorney fees in frivolous appeals, we impose
such sanctions only in egregious cases, "lest there be an improper chilling of
the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions." Porco v. Porco, 752
P.2d 365, 369 [Utah Ct. App. 1988 (defining egregious cases as those in
which appeal is "'obviously without any merit'" and "'taken with no
reasonable likelihood of prevailing.'" (citation omitted.)].
The merits of Elizabeth's fraud claim have been thoroughly examined in this brief.
It is not grounded in fact, warranted by law or based on a good faith argument to reverse the
trial judge's ruling.
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The trial judge called this case a "bitterly contested divorce." (AR 1308 p. 13).
Despite the passions generated in a divorce case, the bitterness should not spill over into a
judgment to pursue causes that are "obviously without merit" and "taken with no reasonable
likelihood of prevailing."
This case has been pending since 1992. It was settled in 1994. Elizabeth's belief that
the property settlement was unfair has kept this case going for more than five years.
The policy of the appellate court to impose sanctions only in egregious cases "lest
there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions" is
understandable. In this case, however, the court should exact sanctions. Elizabeth has used
this case to harass Richard and caused needless increase in the cost of the litigation. She has
also unnecessarily prolonged the litigation.
These proceedings have wreaked havoc on Richard's personal life. He and the
parties' children have suffered.
Richard agonized over Elizabeth's unjustified
misrepresentation asserted in a formal legal proceeding.

accusations of fraud and
The ripple effect of these

accusations were felt in the lives of his children and grandchildren. He settled the case with
Elizabeth in good faith, expecting that the matter was finally resolved. The prospect of years
of protracted, expensive litigation after he believed the matter was settled is devastating.
(AR 0787-0788)
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Elizabeth's dogged persistence in pursuing her fraud claim is an egregious affront to
the system and the participants in the litigation.
A careful review of the trial record, including Elizabeth's testimony, make it
abundantly clear that the health difficulties she suffered post-decree resulted from the
exacerbation of her existing health circumstances at the time of the divorce. These
exacerbations were foreseeable at that time.
Had Elizabeth properly marshaled the evidence in the case this finding by the trial
court would have been painfully apparent.
The court alluded to Elizabeth's motives for pursuing this case. They were not noble.
For these reasons, the court should award Richard reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred for this appeal.
VII. CONCLUSION
The trial court's finding that the stipulation and property settlement agreement is an
integrated contract is not clearly erroneous.
The trial court correctly ruled that the property settlement agreement is unambiguous.
If the trial court erred in not considering extrinsic evidence in determining whether
the settlement agreement is ambiguous, it was harmless error because the proffered extrinsic
evidence showed that Elizabeth received more money per month from Richard in the
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settlement than she intended to receive at the time of the negotiations.
Elizabeth challenged the trial court's findings of fact but because she failed to
marshal the evidence supporting the findings that were challenged and then show that the
marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support them when viewing the evidence and
inferences in a light most favorable to the decision, this court must assume the findings are
correct.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that there was no substantial,
material change in the condition of Elizabeth's health not foreseeable at the time of divorce.
The trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact and
that Richard was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Elizabeth's petition to modify
the alimony award. Elizabeth failed to marshal the evidence, and this court must assume
that the trial court's findings are correct.
The trial court correctly granted Richard's motion to dismiss Elizabeth's fraud claim.
Utah R. App. P. 33 authorizes recovery of costs and attorney fees for frivolous
appeals. Elizabeth's appeal is frivolous in that it is not grounded in fact, warranted by
existing law or based on a good-faith argument to modify the decree of divorce.
The appellate court imposes sanctions only in egregious cases. Egregious cases are
those in which the appeal is obviously without merit and taken with no likelihood of
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prevailing.
Elizabeth's appeal is frivolous and the trial court should award costs and reasonable
attorney fees to Richard to be paid by Elizabeth or by her attorney. Elizabeth was awarded
more than one million dollars in this case and has the ability to pay the costs and fees
requested.
The trial court's rulings should be affirmed in all respects.
Dated this 13th day of November, 1999.
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON

Francis J. Nielsonl/
Attorney for Appellee
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prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion In
appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly
responsible for violations committed by its partners, members,
and employees
(B) On courts initiative On its own initiative, the court
may enter an oider describing the specific conduct that
appears to \ lolatc subdivision (b) and directing an attorney,
law firm or party to show cause whv it has not violated
subdivision (b) with respect thereto
(2) Natuie of sanction, limitations A sanction imposed for
violation of thi< rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to
deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or
include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for
effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant
of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a
represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2)
(B) Monetarv sanctions may not be awarded on the court's
initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before
a voluntary dismissal oi settlement of the claims made by or
against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be
sanctioned
(3) Oidei When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this
rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed
(d) Inapplicability to discovery Subdivisions (a) through (c)
of this rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests,
responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the
provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
Rule 12. D e f e n s e s and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer
within twenty days after the service of the summons and
complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by
statute or order of the court. A party served with a pleading
stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer
thereto within twenty days after the service upon him. The
plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer
within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is
ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a
motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows,
unless a different time is fixed by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall
be served within ten days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days
after the service of the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for
relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
") lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
Jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7)
tenure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further
Pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by
^ n g joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
^ponsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
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Rule 12

denial of such motion or objection If a pleading sets forth a
claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to
serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial,
any party may move for judgment on the pleadings If, on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a
pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned
in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined
before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until
the trial
(e) Motion foi more definite statement
If a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to
frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite
statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The
motion shall point out the defects complained of and the
details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the
court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or
within such other time as the court may fix, the court may
strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make
such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before
responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is
permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within
twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him, the
court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion
under this rule may join with it the other motions herein
provided for and then available to him. If a party makes a
motion under this rule and does not include therein all
defenses and objections then available to him which this rule
permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a
motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted,
except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and
objections which he does not present either by motion as
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to
state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the
pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the
court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if
made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b)
in the light of any evidence that may have been received.

Rule 31
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clerk The entry by the clerk in the records of the court shall
constitute the entry of the judgment of the court
(d) Decision without opinion If, after oral argument, the
court concludes that a case satisfies the criteria set forth in
Rule 31(b) it may dispose of the case by order without written
opinion The decision shall have only such effect as precedent
as is pro\ ided for by Rule 31(f)
(e) Notice of decision Immediately upon the entry of the
decision the clerk shall give notice to the respective parties
and make the decision public in accordance with the direction
of the court
R u l e 31 E x p e d i t e d a p p e a l s decided a f t e r oral a r g u m e n t w i t h o u t w r i t t e n opinion
(a) Motion and stipulation for expedited hearing After the
filing of all briefs in an appeal, a party may move for an
expedited decision without a written opinion The motion shall
be in the form prescribed by Rule 23 and shall describe the
nature of the case, the issues presented and any special
reasons the parties may have for an expedited decision The
court may dispose of any qualified case under this rule upon
its own motion before or after oral argument
(b) Cases which qualify for expedited decision The follow
ing are matters which the court may consider for expedited
decision without opinion
(1) appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues based
primarily on documents
(2) summary judgments
(3) dismissals for failure to state a claim,
(4) dismissals for lack of personal or subject matter juris
diction and
(5) judgments or orders based on uncomplicated issues of
law
(c) In all motions brought under this rule, the substantive
rules of law should be deemed settled, although the parties
may differ as to their application
(d) Appeals ineligible for expedited decision The court will
not grant a motion for an expedited appeal in cases raising
substantial constitutional issues, issues of significant public
interest, issues of law of first impression, or complicated
issues of fact or law
(e) Procedure if expedited motion is granted If a motion for
expedited decision is granted, the appeal will be given an
expedited setting for oral argument within 45 to 60 days from
the date of the order granting the motion Within two days
after cnhrm^icm of the appeal, the court will conference,
decide the case, and issue a written order which need not be
accompanied by an opinion Entry of the order by the clerk in
the records of the court, shall constitute the entry of the
judgment of the court
(f) Effect as precedent Appeals decided under this rule will
not stand as precedent, but, in other respects, will have the
same force and effect as other decisions of the court
(g) Issuance of written opinion If it appears to the court
after the case has been submitted for decision that a written
opinion should be issued, the time limitation in paragraph (e)
shall not apply and the parties will be so notified
Rule 32. Interest o n j u d g m e n t .
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money
in a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law
shall be payable from the date the judgment was entered in
the trial court
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Rule 33. D a m a g e s for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal Except in a first
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that
a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either
fiivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party The court
may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the
party's attorney
(b) Definitions For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based
on a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing
law An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose
such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of
litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing
the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper
(c) Procedures
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any
party or upon its own motion A party may request damages
under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for
summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court
the court shall issue to the party or the party s attorney or
both an order to show cause why such damages should not be
awarded The order to show cause shall set forth the allega
tions which form the basis of the damages and permit at least
ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good
cause shown The order to show cause may be part of the
notice of oral argument
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be
awarded, the court shall grant a hearing
R u l e 34. Award of c o s t s .
(a) To whom allowed Except as otherwise provided by law,
if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the
appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by
the court, if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be
taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered, if a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the
appellee unless otherwise ordered, if a judgment or order is
affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be
allowed as ordered by the court Costs shall not be allowed or
taxed in a criminal case
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah In cases involving the state of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an award
of costs for or against the state shall be at the discretion of the
court unless specifically required or prohibited by law
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other
expenses on appeal The following may be taxed as costs in
favor of the prevailing party in the appeal the actual costs of
a printed or typewritten brief or memoranda and attachments
not to exceed $3 00 for each page, actual costs incurred in the
preparation and transmission of the record, including costs of
the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the
court, premiums paid for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal, and the fees for filing and
docketing the appeal
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur When costs are
awarded to a party in an appeal, a party claiming costs shall,
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